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Central banks  have consistently differentiated the return on the securities they have issued
(money and national debt). In contrast, first best efficiency demands that these securities earn the
same return: the return on capital. A self-financed central bank, without capital and taxes, cannot
achieve this first best. The resulting gaps between the return on capital and the returns on public
securities are implicit taxes. These taxes increase the opportunity costs of the commodities
financed with the liquidation of these securities, so they are indirect taxes on these commodities.
Because taxes on investment are less efficient than taxes on consumption, securities intensive in
financing investment should be taxed at a lower rate than securities intensive in financing
consumption. This is feasible if national debt is investment intensive.  Then, this security should
earn interest and be imposed artificial costs on second hand trading. In addition, because money is
specialized in providing short term liquidity, raising the return on national debt delays expenditure
toward the future. Hence, the payment of interest on national debt brings a windfall of resources
during transitions across balanced paths in addition to the long term welfare gains of this policy.
Similar arguments apply to short and long term maturities of the national debt.In Faig [1998b], I elaborate on the ultimate implications of this proposition when the
1
return on capital has idiosyncratic risk.
3
1. INTRODUCTION
Governments provide a diverse offer of public liabilities with a diverse menu of returns.
For example, they pay interest on national debt, especially to long term maturities, while they  pay
no interest on cash.  In contrast, for first best efficiency, all public liabilities should earn the same
return (adjusted for risk), and this should be the social return on capital. ( See Friedman's [1969]
optimum quantity of money.)  To implement this first best, governments must fund their liabilities
with capital or taxes, and they must be able to generate income from these funding sources
efficiently . Realistically, for a variety of reasons, including the same transaction costs and
1
information imperfections that generate a demand for money, these funding sources are costly to
administer. As a result, governments have never funded their liabilities to the extend that all their
returns approach the return on capital. Could this funding limitations explain the prevalent policy
of issuing a diverse offer of public liabilities? To answer this question, I analyze the optimal offer
of public liabilities issued by a self-financed central bank, without capital or taxes, acting as the
only branch of government. This central bank is imbedded  in a model with overlapping
production activities where both money and national debt provide liquidity to the economy.
The model of this paper develops the framework in Woodford (1990) in the following
fashion. Production projects take time to mature, and the various types of projects in the economy
overlap. So in every period, some projects yield a harvest of output, while other projects require4
investment of real resources for future harvests to come. Individuals can participate at most in one
project at a time, and credit among them is blocked because as in Lucas (1980) credit contracts
cannot be enforced. In this environment, individuals with a harvest have no problem financing
their consumption and investment expenditures, while individuals who are between harvests have
a liquidity problem because they have no earnings on hand. Individuals solve this problem by
selling a portion of their harvests to acquire money and national debt. Then, in periods without a
harvest, individuals use these liquid assets to finance their expenditures. 
 In this model, the central bank may choose to keep the nominal supply of all public
liabilities constant. If this baseline policy is pursued, in a balanced path all public liabilities earn the
same real rate of return: the growth rate of the economy. In this instance, the national debt earns
no (nominal) interest, and in practice all public liabilities are alike. The central bank may choose to
depart from this baseline policy and pay interest on the national debt. To pay this interest
permanently, the self-financed central bank must cross-subsidize the return on the national debt
with money creation. With this policy, the existence of a demand for money in equilibrium
requires that the central bank imposes artificial costs to second hand transactions of the national
debt. (Or alternatively, the central bank could impose other inconveniences for using the national
debt for short term holding horizons.) The end result of this policy is a specialization of liquid
assets by holding period, money providing liquidity at the short end of the spectrum, and the
various maturities of the national debt covering the rest. The main focus of this paper is to identify
possible rationales for this diverse offer of public securities.These taxes finance the negative net worth of the central bank (the central bank issues
2
liabilities but has no assets). 
This forward shifting does not depend on what securities are finally used to purchase
3
goods, but what securities are held during the period preceding the purchase.
5
The first rationale I provide for diversifying the return on public securities is based on a
diverse investment intensity for the private expenditures financed with them. A self-financed
central bank cannot pay the return on capital to all public securities. The resulting gaps between
the return on capital and the returns on public securities are implicit taxes.  These taxes increase
2
the opportunity costs of the commodities financed with the help of the liquidity services the public
securities provide.  Because taxes on investment are more inefficient than taxes on consumption,
3
securities intensive in financing investment should be taxed at a lower rate than securities intensive
in financing consumption. This is feasible if national debt is investment intensive.  Then, this
security should earn interest and be imposed artificial costs on second hand trading. A similar
argument applies to the various maturities of the national debt. For example, an upward-sloping
term structure of the return on the national debt, which is what we normally observe, is a second
best policy for a self-financed central bank if long term maturities are more intensive financing
investment than short term maturities. 
A second rationale for paying interest on the national debt is based  the fact that the
national debt is specialized in relatively long holding periods. Because of this specialization,
raising the return on the national debt delays expenditure toward the future. Hence, the payment
of interest on the national debt, and especially to long term maturities of the national debt, brings
a windfall of resources during transitions across balanced paths. With careful policy by the central6
bank, these resources can lead to a Pareto improvement versus the baseline policy of paying zero
interest on the national debt. 
The efficiency of differentiating the returns of public liabilities by paying interest on
national debt was previously questioned by Bryant and Wallace (1979), Bryant (1980a),  and
Romer (1993). Despite major differences in the modeling strategies, my results compare easily
with these earlier contributions. My results agree with the inefficiency of paying interest on
national debt if public securities do not help to finance future investment, and we limit welfare to
comparisons across balanced paths. This inefficiency is stressed in the contributions by Bryant and
Wallace.  My results agree with Romer that there are conditions under which paying interest on
national debt is optimal. Romer's results are based on how the liquidity services of money and
national debt enter the utility function of a representative individual. Instead, my results follow
from the specialization of liquid assets by holding period, and the diverse investment intensity of
public securities that this specialization allows. 
Several earlier contributions have provided empirical support for a quasi-monetary role for
the national debt, especially for its short-term maturities. For example, Fried and Howitt (1983)
argue that this role is a good explanation that at low frequencies the real interest rates earned on
Treasury Bills decline as the rate of inflation rises. Similarly, Fried (1995) argues that this role
explains the premium of one period returns of long-term Treasury Bills over short-term  Treasury
Bills, and it explains the correlations of this premium with other macroeconomic variables. Finally,
Bansal and Coleman (1996 ) argue that this role can also explain the equity premium puzzle.For recent contributions using this modeling of liquidity and dealing with issues related to
4
this paper see Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) Schreft and Smith (1997), and Holmström and Tirole
(1998).  
7
Although, the main emphasis of the present paper is normative, it reinforces this empirical support
in providing a plausible normative rationale for the prevalent qualitative structure of the returns on
public liabilities.
This paper extends my earlier work on the overlapping production activities model (Faig
[1998a]) by prolonging the production time to more than two periods and introducing multiple
liquid assets. In both papers, I borrow heavily from earlier contributions. The roles of money and
the national debt in completing markets are similar to the roles they play in Foley and Helwig
(1975) and Bewley (1980), and the rapidly growing literature that has followed these seminal
contributions. In particular, the role of publicly supplied liquid assets in financing investment
expenditures is similar to Woodford (1990), except for the fact that in here the returns on money
and national debt affect no only the size of investment but also its composition.  The demand for
liquidity based on a costly or slow liquidation of alternative assets is found in classical
contributions such as Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) .  Finally,
4
the endogenous growth features of the model have much in common with the 'Ak' model in Barro
(1990).
In summary, this paper advances a new perspective on the normative analysis of the
returns of outside public liabilities such as: money and national debt. This new perspective
emphasizes the liquidity roles of these securities to finance private expenditures, the specialization8
of these securities by holding period, and their relative intensities to finance diverse types of 
private expenditures.  In particular, if the expenditures financed with national debt are more
investment intensive than those financed with money, it is second best for a self-financed central
bank to cross-subsidize the payment of interest on national debt with money creation. Similarly,
an upward sloping term structure of the return on national debt is second best if the investment
intensity of the national debt increases with term to maturity. Thus, this paper provides a plausible
normative rationale for the prevalent qualitative features of the structure of public liabilities. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the overlapping production activities
model used in this paper. Section 3 analyzes the behavior of individuals in the framework of this
model. Section 4 constructs a balanced path equilibrium. Section 5 compares the welfare of a
representative individual across balanced paths. Section 6 analyzes the transitional effects across
balanced paths for a tractable special case. Finally, section 7 concludes with a brief summary of
the findings and some directions for future research.
2. THE MODEL
Consider an economy populated with a large number of individuals. In this economy, 
individuals possess a non transferable production technology which is the only vehicle to employ
the capital they own. The output of these technologies is homogeneous, and it can either be
consumed or invested.  Invested capital is the only input these technologies require. Production
takes time. To obtain a harvest of output, individuals have to invest in their technologies for
several consecutive periods. Also, the various production activities overlap. So in every period,9
some individuals have a harvest, while others are investing for the harvests to come. This
overlapping structure of production implies that individuals must trade, so they can consume and
invest in the periods without a harvest of their own. But trading is limited by the fact that
individuals can hide their identity and their capital if it is in their best interest to do so,  precluding
credit contracts in their multiple forms (mortgaging capital, future markets, joint firms, ... ). (See
Bryant [1980b] for a related discussion of the moral hazard problems behind the demand for
money). These trading constraints are relaxed with the existence of two public liabilities: money
and national debt. Individuals sell a portion of their harvest to acquire these assets, which are
spent to buy output in periods when they do not receive a harvest.
The imperfect functioning of capital markets is crucial for public securities to be valued in
this model. Following Lucas (1980), I preclude the existence of credit. At the cost of complicating
the model, this extreme assumption could be replaced with weaker alternatives. For example, it
could be replaced with transaction costs in establishing or enforcing credit contracts. (See for
example Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) for a related model with these costs.) Also, it could be
relaxed with a limitation of credit to a portion of capital easy to identify and thus suitable as
collateral.  For simplicity, these alternative assumptions are not pursued here. 
Money and national debt are differentiated by their liquidity. Money is perfectly liquid,
while national debt is composed of discount bonds with second hand trading costs. By making
these costs sufficiently high, the government can create a demand for money for short term
holding horizons even if money yields a lower return than national debt.  Likewise, differentc k m x t t st t
s
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maturities of national debt can coexist even if their return increases with their term as long as the
cost on second hand trading is high enough to discourage using long term debt for short term
holding horizons. The cost to second hand trades of the national debt is a matter of policy. Its
imposition is a device to differentiate the returns on money and national debt of various
maturities. The government can eliminate this cost and equate the return on all liquid assets.
Individuals with a harvest allocate their wealth into consumption, capital, and liquid assets.
The flow budget constraint for a representative individual at this stage, to be denoted stage 0, is
the following equation:
(1) ;
where c  = consumption at stage 0 in period t; 0t
k  = capital at stage 0 in period t; 0t
x = real wealth at the beginning of period t; and  t
m  = real demand for liquid asset (of term) s in period t. st
Liquid asset 1 is money. The other liquid assets are the various pure discount bonds composing
the national debt. The relationship between the real quantities of liquid assets and their nominal
face value is 
(2)   .c k
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where M  = nominal face value invested in liquid asset s in period t; st
q  = discount price of liquid asset s in period t (q  = 1 for all t) ; and st 1t
p = price of output in period t. t
Individuals without a harvest use their liquid wealth to finance their consumption and investment
expenditures. In principle, they could also use their liquid wealth to purchase new liquid assets.
However, in all the deterministic equilibria considered in this paper this possibility is not carried
out because of a combination of three facts: The return on physical capital exceeds that of liquid
assets. The transaction costs for second hand trading of the national debt are high enough to
prevent using long term debt for short term holding horizons. And the expected one period return
on liquid assets is non decreasing with their term. Consequently, individuals not having a harvest
spend the value of their liquid assets maturing in that period:
(3) ;
where r  = real gross return of liquid asset s that matures in period t; that is . st
In all periods, consumption, capital, and the demand for liquid assets must be nonnegative: 
(4) .
In the equilibria considered where the return on liquid assets is dominated by the return on
capital, an individual holds no liquid assets at the beginning of a period with a harvest. The
harvest itself depends on the capital invested in the preceding  S + 1 periods. Therefore, the
wealth of individuals with a harvest in t + S +1 isx F k t S t + + = 1 ( )
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(5)
where k = the vector  ; and t
F =  gross production function.
For ease of notation, the undepreciated capital is incorporated in the function F. The function F is
positive, twice continuously differentiable, increasing, concave, and homogenous of degree one.
Also, it satisfies standard Inada conditions for an interior solution. 
The individuals' horizon is infinite. In recursive form, the utility of an individual having a
harvest in period t is
(6) ;
where U = utility in period t; t
ß = discount factor (ß > 0); and
s = inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (positive, and if s = 1, the
instantaneous utility should be understood as logarithmic).
The only government agency is a central bank that provides and manages the supply of
liquid assets in the economy. The central bank can choose to change the return on liquid assets by
changing their supply through open market operations, and revising if necessary the transaction
costs that hinder second hand trading of national debt. These activities, though, must be self-M q M M st st
s
S
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, for all 
M M M s t st s t s st = + - ( ) D  for all   and all 
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financed. Thus, the current revenue from selling bonds  and issuing money must equal the current
value of maturing bonds.  Equivalently, the net seigniorage measured in a cash-flow basis must be
zero in all periods:
(7) .
The equilibrium concept to be applied is that of a recursive liquidity dominated
competitive equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium) where the sequence of prices and returns, the
allocation of harvests, and the quantities of liquid assets satisfy the following conditions:
(i) individuals have perfect foresight about prices and returns and take them as given;
(ii) individuals maximize utility subject to constraints (1) to (5);
(iii) all liquid assets are valued, their one period return is non decreasing with term to
maturity and dominated by the return on capital;  and
(iv) all markets clear:
(8) , and
(9) .
Among the set of equilibria, special attention is given to balanced path equilibria where all real
variables grow at the same rate and the real rates of return on liquid assets are constant over time.max ) subject to 
k t s t s
s
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s t s t t
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This section characterizes an optimal plan for a representative individual. In this optimal
plan, investment must be intertemporally allocated to maximize the size of the next harvest. That
is, if the individual gets a harvest in period t, then the vector of capital stocks relevant to the next
harvest, k, must solve the following program:  t
(10) ;
where ? = proportion of wealth to be used in financing capital up to the next harvest. The first t
order conditions for an interior solution to this problem are
(11) .
This condition states that at stage 0, the marginal return of investing a unit of output immediately
must be equal to the marginal compounded return of purchasing a liquid asset to finance
investment at a later stage of the project.
In the optimal plan, consumption must be allocated to satisfy standard Euler equations. In
periods with a harvest, the marginal rate of substitution between immediate consumption and
consumption at a period  before the next harvest must be equal to the gross real return on the
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0  for 
The theorems in Alvarez and Stokey (1997) require that the ratio of consumption to
5
wealth is bounded away from zero for s $ 1. Therefore, their application requires finding positive
lower bounds for c  / x that are never binding. This can be easily achieved along balanced paths st t
and the transitional paths in Section 6 with an explicit solution.
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(12) .
Also, in all periods the marginal rate of substitution between immediate consumption and
consumption at the next harvest must be equal to the gross marginal product of immediately
invested capital:
(13) .
To ensure the existence of an optimal path, we must restrict the parameters describing
preferences and technology. These restrictions must ensure that there is at most one feasible path
that gives infinite utility to the individual. Also, they must ensure that there is at least one feasible
path that gives utility higher than minus infinity. The following assumption achieves both
objectives for the equilibrium paths to be analyzed here (see Alvarez and Stokey [1998])  : 
5




(i) If s < 1, then ￿  G µ > 0 such that F (G µ) #  G µ   and ß G µ   < 1.
* S+1 1-s
(ii) If s $ 1, then ￿ µ > 0 such that F (µ) $ µ  and ß µ  < 1.
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Intuitively, the first part of the assumption ensures that technology is not too productive when
s < 1 so the utility of feasible paths does not diverge to infinity.  The second part of the
assumption ensures that technology is sufficiently productive when s $ 1 so there is at least a
feasible path with a utility higher than minus infinity.
4. THE BALANCED PATH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, I will construct a balanced path equilibrium along which both the rates of
return on assets and the ratios among real variables are constant. First, I will construct the
allocation along a balanced path equilibrium for given rates of return on liquid assets. Second, I
will show how the rates of return on liquid assets are related to monetary policy. And third, I will
characterize the constraints on monetary policy imposed by the equilibrium concept and the
budget constraint of the central bank. Throughout this section, I will drop the time subscripts
when unnecessary. 
For a representative individual, let t be a period with a harvest. Denote 
the relative demands  , and   respectively. Using (11),  the relative
allocation of capital   is determined by the following  S equations:
(14) .
Because of constant returns to scale, the marginal products of capital depend only on the set of




































































Because preferences are homothetic and the rates of return are constant, wealth must grow at the
same rate as consumption.  Hence,  using (5),  the proportion of a harvest immediately allocated
to capital is determined by the following condition:
(16) .
Using (12), the set  is determined by the following S equations:
(17)  .
Finally, to complete a description of the allocation along a balanced path, the proportion of
consumption consumed at stage 0 follows then from the intertemporal budget constraint that
results combining (1), (3) and (5) with (14) to (17):
(18) .
I describe next how the rates of return on liquid assets are related to monetary policy.  By
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(19) .
Note that the gross real return on money,  r , is the inverse of the gross rate of inflation. Also, the 1
inverse of the discount price q  is the nominal return on security s for the s periods this security s
takes to mature. The real quantities of liquid assets are implied by the constraint (3):
(20) .
For the rates of return to be constant, this equation implies that the supplies of all liquid assets
must grow at a common constant rate ? along a balanced path equilibrium. Market clearing in the
money market then implies that ? must satisfy the standard relation:
(21) .
For a set of returns  to be an equilibrium all markets must clear. The money clears
if  ,  so the standard neutrality result applies. The markets for the other liquid
assets clear if their initial supplies satisfy the following equations: 
(22) .
Finally,  by Walras' Law, the output market clears if the net seigniorage collected by the central
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where R =  ratio of net seigniorage over gross output.  A set of returns   to be consistent
with the equilibrium concept defined in Section 2 must satisfy not only equation (23) but also the
following two incentive constraints. First, liquid returns must be weakly dominated by the return
on capital, that is  . Second,  the central bank must be able to make each liquid asset
the best instrument to transfer wealth for a period equal to its maturity. For example, given that
transaction costs on the national debt cannot be negative, this rules out money having a higher
return than  national debt. If this were the case, the demand for national debt would be zero and
money would be the only public liability. Thus, this would be equivalent to a policy with zero
interest on the national debt. These two incentive constraints on the set of returns are satisfied
with the baseline policy of keeping a constant  supply of all liquid assets.  In this case, the return
of liquid assets along a balanced path satisfies r  = g   for s = 1, ..., S. So all assets have the same s
s
one period rate of return. This one period rate of return is dominated by the rate of return on
capital as the following argument demonstrates. Multiplying by k  both sides of (11) and s(t+s)
aggregating over all s implies  . Given that   and
? # 1, the dominance of liquid assets by capital follows: 
(24) .20
5. THE SILVERED RULE
This section characterizes the monetary policy that maximizes the utility of a
representative individual in a balanced path. If the government could use lump-sum taxes to
subsidize monetary assets, then, as it is well known, efficiency requires to raise the return on all
monetary assets to equate the social return on capital. This first best policy, known as the
optimum quantity of money after Friedman (1969),  is precluded in this paper by the lack of funds
of the central bank and the constraint that current seigniorage cannot be negative. The second
best problem to be solved in this section imposes constraint (23) on the set of returns on liquid
assets as well as the other constraints consistent with a balanced path equilibrium. With these
constraints, the problem to be solved consists in finding the set of returns that maximizes the
utility of a representative individual having a harvest if the inherited capital stocks of the
individuals not having a harvest were automatically adjusted to the balanced path levels. The
solution to this problem is a second best modified golden rule, which for short I will name the
Silvered Rule. The transitional effects abstracted in this rule and the distributional consequences
they entail are dealt in the next section.
Let V be the indirect utility function of a representative individual in a balanced path
equilibrium. Consider a marginal reform in which the return on liquid asset i (i > 1) is raised and
this increase is financed with a reduction on the return from money. Using Roy's identity, the total
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Therefore, combining (25) to (27), the effect of the reform on V is 
(28) .
The Silvered Rule implies the baseline policy of zero nominal interest on the national debt,
or equivalently r  = g  for all s, when expression (28) is non positive for all liquid assets. To see s
s


































































































































































































1  for all 
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(10), the elasticity of g with respect to r is proportional to the discounted expense  : i
(29) .
Using (29) and evaluating (28) at the point where r  = g  for all s,  expression (28) simplifies to s
s
(30)
Therefore,  . That is, the Silvered Rule implies zero
nominal interest on national debt when money is weakly specialized in financing investment
expenditures. Conversely, the Silvered Rule implies paying interest on national debt when,
realistically, money is specialized in financing consumption expenditures. 
An interior Silvered Rule where the interest paid on national debt is positive and
increasing with maturity can be easily characterized using (28) and (29). If the Silvered Rule is
interior, all marginal reforms of the sort considered in deriving (28) must have a zero effect on V.
This implies that the numerator of the fraction inside the square brackets in (28) must be equal to
a constant ? for all i. Consequently,
(31) .d g
d r S







































Thus the proportional premium of r over g is increasing with the specialization of asset i on i
i
investment expenses (middle term in RHS) and decreasing with the seigniorage cost that a change
on r induces through the demands for liquid assets (last term in RHS). This last term vanishes i
when no assets are cross-subsidized. The constant ? is inversely related to the Lagrange multiplier
of the central bank's budget constraint (23), and its value ensures that this constraint is satisfied.
This constraint implies that if r > g  for some i, then there must be another security for which  r < i i
i
g.  Hence if money is the public liability with the lowest return, the gross rate of growth of the
i
money supply ? = g / r  must be larger than one. 1
As implied by (28), the Silvered Rule differs from a zero nominal interest policy only if the
return on liquid assets affects growth. However, in general the Silvered Rule does not maximize
the growth rate. The effect on the growth rate of a marginal reform in which r (i > 1) is raised at i
the expense r  is 1
(32)
Comparison of (32) with (25) using (3)  implies that a marginal reform with a non negative effect
on V raises the growth rate if  . Thus, at the Silvered Rule the marginal reform
considered deriving (32) increases the growth rate if asset i is specialized in investment expenses
in relation to money.F k k k Ak k k t t t t t t ( , , ) 0 1 2 0 1 2
0 1 2 =
a a a
~ ( ) c0 0
3 1 = - q b ~ k0 0
3 = a b ~ ( ) ; m i i i i = - + = q b a b 1 1 2
3 3 for   and 
q b b b i
i i = + + =
- ( ) 1
2 1for   0, 1, and 2
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6. AN EXAMPLE WITH TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS
The Silvered Rule of Section 5 maximizes an incomplete measure of welfare because it
abstracts from the transitional effects of long-term policy changes. Unfortunately, as it is common
in most growth models, transitional dynamics have no explicit solution in general. For this reason,
this section addresses these transitional effects for an interesting special case for which transitional
dynamics have an explicit solution.
Out of the balanced path, an equilibrium can be explicitly solved with unit elasticities of
substitution in consumption and gross production. For ease of exposition, I will further assume
that harvests come three periods apart, so there are only two liquid assets money and a two period
bond. Consequently,  . A short coming of this specialization is
that it rules out partial depreciation of capital with the standard assumption that undepreciated
capital is additive in the gross production function. However, this specialization does not rule out
a high value for a  which mimics the fact that a large portion of gross output remains invested for 0
the next harvest. With this specialization of functional forms, individuals allocate their harvests in
shares independent of the rates of return on all assets: 
(33) ,   , and 
where  . Hence, the demand functions for liquid
assets constitute a generalized system of quantity equations with constant velocity. In the periods






















































( ) - - = + - g
~ ( ) c t t 1 1
3 1 1 = -
- q b g ~ k t t 1 1
3 1 =
- a b g ~ ( ) ~ c k t t t t 2 2
3
2 2
3 1 = , and    q b j a b j - =
j g t t m m = + -
- 1 1
1
1 2 ( )(~ ~ )









1 2 z b a z g j
a a a ; where  =  
25
independent of rates of the rates of  return on all assets:
(34)    and   .
The market clearing conditions are 
(35)  and   ;
where ? is the growth factor of the money supply in period t. The system of equation (33) to (35) t
implies that the allocation of x depends on ?. In particular, t t
(36) ,  ,  ;
where  . With a constant ?, the allocation of output remains t
constant over time.  Thus, using (33) and (36), the law of motion of x is t
(37) .
(The subscripts on ? and n have been dropped because these variables are held constant). The
return on liquid assets affects the allocation of capital, and so it affects total factor productivity. In
this special case, total factor productivity is proportional to the policy factor  ?. Furthermore,
because growth is increasing with the return on capital, the growth factor in a balanced path
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.
In this special case, condition (31) characterizing an interior Silvered Rule drops the last
term because the demand for assets is independent from rates of return. The simplified equations
can then be easily solved together with (21) and (23) to obtain explicit formulae for the growth
factor of money and the growth rate of return on the national debt along the Silvered Rule path:
(38) ; and
(39) .
(Note  and  are independent of ? in this example ). Thus, as long as R = 0, the Silvered Rule
calls for ?  > 1 if  a ?  < a ? . This condition is equivalent to national debt being investment
*
1 2 2 1
intensive.  The definition of ? implies ?  > ? , so a ?  < a ?  if a  # a i 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2.
To conclude this section, I will show that, at least in this example, 0transitional effects
reinforce the case for paying positive interest on the national debt. Suppose an economy where
money is not investment intensive: a ?  # a ? . In this economy, the Silvered Rule either calls for 1 2 2 1
































rates (a ?  = a ? ). The following argument shows that if this economy is in a balanced path with a 1 2 2 1
zero nominal interest rate, there is a simple monetary reform leading to positive nominal interest
rates that accomplishes a Pareto improvement. This reform consists in a marginal increase in the
supply of liquid assets with the increase in the supply of national debt starting in period 0 and the
increase in the supply of money starting in period 2. Because the demand for liquid assets is
insensitive to interest rates, the price level and the allocation of output in the periods 0 and 1 is
unchanged by the reform. The discounts on public bonds though become positive as their nominal
supply increases and their real demand is unchanged. Hence, even if the harvest in period 2 is
unchanged because it depends on previous investments, its allocation changes. With the reform,
real resources shift from individuals at stage 1 of production (spending money) to individuals at
stage 2 of production (spending bonds). Consequently, the harvest in period 3 is increased
because its production has used the same capital at stages 0 and 1, but more capital at stage 2. All
harvests after period 3 are also increased  because of the law of motion (37) and the fact that at
? = 1, the policy factor ? locally increases with ?. (This follows immediately from the Implication
Function Theorem applied to the expressions defining ? and n in [36] and [37]).
To show that all individuals are better off with the new policy, consider first the
individuals with a harvest at the moment the money supply starts growing in period 2. Before
period 2, the reform has no effect on these individuals. After period 2, the discount factors of
future consumption goods are given by
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where ?  is the discount factor from period 0 to period t for individuals at stage of production s. st
At period 2, the marginal change in the indirect utility function as ? increases is
(41)
.
In this expression, the second line uses Roy's identity and (40). The third line uses the Implicit
Function Theorem applied to (36) and the positive effect on output induced by the reform.
Finally, the last equality follows from n = 1 when ? = 1. Identical argument applies to the
individuals with a harvest in period 1 changing subscripts appropriately. The argument is also
applicable to the individuals with a harvest in period 0 from period 3 onwards. These individuals,
though, get an extra bonus in period 2 when they receive a higher return on the debt they
purchased at 0 without having to endure a lower return on money in period 1. Consequently, the
policy reform leading to positive interest rates accomplishes a Pareto improvement. 29
7. CONCLUSION
The optimal structure of outside public liabilities when these securities provide liquidity
services cannot disregard their specialization by holding period, and their relative intensities to
finance investment and consumption expenditures. When these features are taken into account,
there are plausible and empirically testable conditions to rationalize a diverse offer of public
liabilities, with the national debt earning positive interest ,and with the return on the national debt
increasing with term to maturity. This finding does not contradict the optimum quantity of money
rule. If the central bank of my model could be efficiently funded with capital or taxes, then it
would be efficient to equalize the return on all liquid assets to the social return on capital. In this
paper, I do not discuss how efficiently the government can manage capital or raise taxes to
finance the central bank operations. Instead, in this paper I take as a given the self-financing
constraint of the central bank, and then I inquire about the possible rationales for diversifying the
offer of public liabilities by paying interest on the national debt. A first rationale for this
diversification is that the national debt is investment intensive compared to money. Because taxes
on investment are less efficient than taxes on consumption, securities intensive in financing
investment should be implicitly taxed at a lower rate than securities intensive in financing
consumption. Hence the gap between the rates of return of capital and the national debt should be
narrower than the gap between the rates of return of capital and money. A second rationale for
paying interest on the national debt is based  the fact that the national debt is specialized in
relatively long holding periods. Because of this specialization, raising the return on the national
debt delays expenditure toward the future. Hence, the payment of interest on the national debt,This proposition is easily established using (38) and (39) and remarking that around the
6
Silvered path increases in the rate of  growth of the money supply are associated with a faster rate
of growth. In general, however, this proposition requires that the investment intensity of money
and national debt is not too sensitive to the return on liquid assets. 
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and especially to long term maturities of the national debt, brings a windfall of resources during
transitions across balanced paths. With careful policy by the central bank, these resources can lead
to a Pareto improvement versus the baseline policy of paying zero interest on the national debt.
Similar rationales can justify an upward-sloping term structure for the return on the national debt. 
The self-financing constraint on the central bank is convenient but not essential to the
analysis of this paper. As long as public liabilities are not fully funded, the central bank will not be
able to equalize the return on the liabilities it issues to the social return on capital, and a similar
analysis to the one offered here characterizes the tradeoff between implicit taxes on money and
national debt. If the net worth of the public sector changes over time, perhaps due to protracted
government budget deficits, the implicit taxes on money and the national debt necessary to finance
them must change as well. Typically, when a government relies heavily on seigniorage to finance
the public sector, inflation will be high and the real interest rate on the national debt will be low.
6
Therefore, if long-run changes in inflation are driven by varying reliance on seigniorage, inflation
and real interest rates on Treasury Bills will be negatively correlated at low frequencies. In
contrast, if long-run changes in inflation are driven by arbitrary changes in the rate of growth of
the money supply with a constant reliance on seigniorage, inflation and real interest rates on
Treasury Bills will be positively correlated. The negative correlation between inflation and real
interest rates on Treasury Bills at low frequencies documented by Summers (1983) was interpret31
by Fried and Howitt (1983) as an indication of the national debt rendering liquidity services. This
paper brings this interpretation one step further. This negative correlation is not only an indication
that the national debt renders liquidity services, it is also an indication that policy makers are
sensitive to the inefficiencies caused by the low returns earned on liquid securities . Thus, when
the seigniorage to be financed by implicit taxes on money and national debt rises, both of these
taxes are simultaneously raised to minimize their overall welfare costs.
Future research must address how the results of this paper are modified when there is
uncertainty on future expenditure needs. An extension along these lines will have to determine the
exact costs to second hand trading. In the present deterministic framework, the exact shape and
size of these costs is irrelevant as they are never incurred in equilibrium. However, with uncertain
expenditure needs individuals revise their plans over time, so there is an ex-post welfare cost of
making it difficult for them to liquidate their national debt earlier than anticipated.  In such an
extension, the optimal policy will have to balance the tradeoff between making the national debt
difficult to trade as a prerequisite to raise its return, and the ex-post welfare cost arising when
individuals are prevented to revise their plans. 
Future research must also address how the results of this paper are modified when outside
moneys (cash and national debt) coexist with inside moneys (deposits). The existence of inside
moneys can easily be incorporated to the present model by assuming that some types of capital are
suitable as collateral. If these types are relatively scarce, inside and outside moneys may coexist .
In this economy, the optimal structure of the monetary sector must address not only the efficiency32
issues raised in this paper, but also the efficiency issues raised by the likely disparity between the
equilibrium rates of return earned by the types of capital suitable as collateral and the types of
capital unsuitable as collateral. The solution to this problem will provide not only a normative
theory of inflation and nominal interest rates, but also a normative theory of required reserves and
other banking regulations.33
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